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Abstract: Shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution, some four decades ago, there were no passenger cars in 
China when Volkswagen AG started its negotiations inthis country. The country was poor and underdeveloped. 
Today, the GDP of China reached USD 17.6 billion compared to the US’ 17.4 billion USD. Car production in 
China is now more than 18 million cars per year, more than in the USA. Today, China is still a socialist country 
and its economic system is called ‘socialist market economy’ but there are about 50 million private companies, 
400 million people are belonging to the middle class and there are about 800 super rich having more than 100 
million USD on average. In this ‘sino-marxist’ country, there are even 130 multi billionaires in USD. No wonder 
that under these circumstances, joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, especially also in the 
automotive industry, are welcome.
Volkswagen started its negotiations with its Chinese partner, STAC (Shanghai Tractor and Automobile 
Investment Corporation), BoC (Bank of China) and CNAIC (China National Automotive Industry Corporation) in 
1979. These negotiations ended in 1984 by setting up the ‘Shanghai-Volkswagen’ joint venture which started the 
production of the Santana in 1985. Some years later, in 1988, Volkswagen started the negotiations with FAW (First 
Automobile Work) in Changchun. These negotiations lasted much shorter and the second VW joint venture, ‘FAW-
VW’, started with the production of Jetta and Audi 100, 100, 000 cars per year in 1991.In 2004, the ‘Volkswagen 
Group China’ (VGC), a wholly VW-owned holding company was set up in Beijing in order to coordinate the VW-
participations, the sales and marketing of its joint ventures, the purchasing, personnel and governmental relations 
as well as finance. Today, VGC has, including its 16 subsidiaries, 95,000 employees, has built 30 million cars at 30 
Chinese production sites and sold them by 5,000 dealers (with 330,000 employees). In 2016, VGC has built about 
4 million cars. 
Keywords: Volkswagen (VW), joint venture, wholly foreign-owned company, socialist market economy, sino-
marxism, Shanghai Automotive Industry Company (SAIC), Shanghai-Volkswagen (SVW), First Automobile Work 
(FAW), Volkswagen Group China (VGC)
1. INTRODUCTION
The title of this paper, a least the ‘A German lawyer…’ part, needs an explanation. The 
Author is a German citizen and has worked in the Foreign Legal Department of Volkswagen 
AG in Wolfsburg/Germany but he studied Swiss law in French in Geneva; was an attorney 
in Shanghai and taught International Business Law at the Central European University 
(CEU) in English in Budapest/Hungary. None of the Author’s activities in Volkswagen 
AG’s Foreign Legal Department were concerned with German law but his point of view 
will be that of a German lawyer as his experiences in investing and doing business in China 
will be presented from a former Volkswagen lawyer and Deputy General Manager of 
Shanghai Volkswagen perspective.
* Dr. iur., former Professor of International Business Law in the Legal Studies Department of 
Central European University in Budapest/Hungary, e-mail: stefanmessmann@outlook.com. This 
thematic issue (Missed and new opportunities in world trade. Eds. Csongor István Nagy & Zoltán 
Víg) was published as part of the research project of the HAS-Szeged Federal Markets ‘Momentum’ 
Research Group.
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2. BIG CHANGES
Shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution, some four decades ago, there were no 
passenger cars in China when Volkswagen AG started its negotiations in this country.
Today, on the other hand, there is almost no space in this country without cars.
In order to explain this big change, and the enormous contribution of Volkswagen 
AG(VWAG) to this change, the Author will deal first with the actual situation in China, 
thereafter with its economic and political system, thirdly, with its higher education, which 
made a large contribution to the economic development of China, fourthly, with the 
development of the Chinese law, which made possible foreign direct investments (FDI), 
before entering, finally, in detail to VWAG investment and doing business in this country.
3. CHINA TODAY
China has today a population of 1.388 billion people.1 Shanghai, the city of the first joint 
venture of VWAG in China, has 24.15 million people2 and is the largest city of this country. 
Changchun, the capital of Jilin province, the city of the second joint venture of VWAG, has 
a population of 3.815 million.3 
1 China Population (2017) link 1.
2 Shanghai Population (2017) link 2.
3 Changchun Population (2010) link 3 
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In 1978, shortly after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), only 18% of the Chinese 
population lived in cities. Today, 51% of the Chinese, i.e., about 700 million, are living in 
cities which also means a large increase of social wealth.4 In the next 20 years, an additional 
hundreds of millions of Chinese may also move to cities.5 Today, China is the second 
biggest economic power in the world, after the USA, with the potential to overtake the USA 
in the next decades, among others according to such experts like Zbigniew Brzezinski.6 
Already in 2014, the Chinese GDP reached USD 17.6 million compared with the USD 17.4 
million of the USA and it is expected that in 2050 the Chinese GDP will reach USD 61.1 
billion against the USD 42.2 billion by the USA.7 It is no wonder, therefore, that China is 
attracting more foreign investors. In 2016, the FDI to China was USD 118 billion8 after 
USD 10 billion only in 1990 and USD 60 billion in 2000. This FDI went mostly to industry, 
technology (IT) and leasing sectors but Chinese companies have also started to invest more 
abroad. Thus, in 2016, FDI from China reached USD 61 billion.9 Chinese companies, 
private and state ones, are making frequently purchase tours in the USA and in the EU 
countries to buy enterprises which have important know-how, necessary for the further 
development of the Chinese industry e.g., last year, Chinese firms closed overseas deals 
worth USD 61 billion. This was up by 16% on 2014 and is the highest level on record.10
The most FD to China came from Hong Kong and Taiwan and from the EU countries 
like France, Germany and the UK and predominantly went to Guangdong, Shanghai and 
Jiangsu.11
China is also actually the largest trade partner of the EU and the USA with a trade 
volume of USD 560 billion in 2016 and thus exports more than the USA and Germany 
together.12 It is no wonder that as a result of this fast economic development, China’s 
foreign currency reserves amount to USD 3,000 billion13 and the Renminbi is today in the 
basket of currencies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).14
4. CHINESE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEM
China is still a socialist country but its economic system is called a ‘socialist market 
economy’. However, it does not mean that the Chinese economy is a state economy, like 
other former socialist countries and China before 1978.When Chairman Mao Zedong died 
in 1976, the average income per person was USD 250 per year but it is now 30 times 
higher.15 As a result of this development, there are today about 50 million private companies 
in China, among them such well-known companies like Vanke, Geely, and Alibaba, accounts 
for about 80% of the Chinese companies producing about 60-70% of the country’s GDP. 
  4 Majority of Chinese Now Live in Cities (2017) link 4.
  5 Population in the cities (2014) link 5.
  6 Brzezinski (2012) 56. 
  7 Europa fällt zurück (2015) link 6.
  8 China Daily 2017 (2017) link 7. 
  9 FDI from China (2016) link 8. 
10 Better than barbarians (2016) link 9.
11 FDI to China (2005) link 10.
12 China’s exports (2015) link 11.
13 Die Weltwährung (2016) link 12.
14 Der Yuan etabliert sich auf Kosten des Euro (2015) link 13.
15 Pickert (2017). 
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About 4,000 new private companies are registered daily in this country though the State’s 
influence on the economy remains high.
The result of such economic development is that there is today about 400 million 
people belonging to the middle class and about 800 super rich having more than 100 million 
USD in average and there are even 130 multi billionaires in USD including several women.
The richest Chinese is Wang Jianlin, whose father fought under Chairman Mao Zedong, 
owns a fortune of USD 34 billion.16 Belonging to the middle class means having an 
apartment or a house and, of course, a car. In 2016, about 120 million Chinese went abroad 
as tourists and about 900 million have a mobilephone. It is no wonder that, under these 
circumstances, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is sometimes called ‘Chinese Capitalist 
Party’ by some Western observers.
The long term strategic aim for Chinese companies is to buy more foreign enterprises, 
especially in the USA and Germany, in order to enhance their technology but are also 
interested in airports and consumer goods.17
Higher education in China also contributed to this fast economic development. There 
are today 25 million students in higher education in this country, among them 73,000 PhD 
students in technical subjects, while between 1981 and 2001 there were ‘only’ 51,000 
students in technical subjects. It is also of great importance for China that there are 140,000 
Chinese students studying in the USA alone and the common experience, upto now, is that 
80% of theses Chinese students studying abroad will return home.
The Chinese political system is generally considered as a ‘one party system’ though 
there are eight political parties in the People’s Congress, twice as many as in the Hungarian 
Parliament. The electoral system is also developing, though it is often ignored in the 
Western countries. For example, on the country level, there is no limitation to the number 
of candidates for local elections and they must not be necessarily members of the CCP.
The official political system in the PRC in the post-Mao period is often considered by 
Western China-researchers as ‘pragmatic’, ‘post-Maoist’, or ‘capitalist’ and according to 
them, ‘Maoism’ has been replaced by Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism. They refer to a CCP 
‘Resolution about some questions in our Party history since the founding of the CCP’ of 
1981, which pointed out the ‘grave mistakes’ made by Mao Zedong in his ‘late years’. The 
CCP, however, continues to uphold the ‘Mao Zedong Thought’, except for a few ideas 
propagated by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution. The ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ is, 
however, only a part of the CCP’s ‘guide to action’. The CCP ‘takes Marxism-Leninism, 
Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, The important thought of Three Represents 
and the Scientific Outlook on Development as its guide to action’. Therefore, an adequate 
name for the whole system of this ‘guide to action’, for the actual Chinese political system 
is ‘Sinomarxism’.18
5. DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE LAW
The origin of Chinese law dates back to a time many centuries before the beginning of the 
Christian era and had two fundamental characteristics: Legist and Confucian, consisting in 
‘the tradition of promulgating dynastic codes and a steady adherence to a set of underlying 
16 Der reichste Chinese (2015) link 14. 
17 Chinesen kaufen (2016) link 15. 
18 Von Senger and Senn (2014).
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principles based on the Confucianist world outlook’.19 At that time, there was no concept of 
independent judiciary as the local mandarins acted as judges but a special board, called 
Tingwei or Dalisi, acted as the highest court of appeal.20
Modernisation started after the Boxer Uprising of 1900 and this including legal reform. 
In 1906, the first Western-style law school was opened in Beijing and after the Revolution 
of 1911, the modernization of the law continued and German law seemed to be especially 
attractive to the new Chinese leadership, because of the military force of Germany at that 
time.
After Mao Zedong took power in 1949, the Soviet influence also become predominant 
in the Chinese legislation. It was followed by total lawlessness during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976).21 After Mao’s death in 1976, a new period started in China, also 
concerning the development of law. 
The most important laws, from the economic point of view, after the Cultural 
Revolution were the Law on Joint Ventures using Chinese and Foreign Investment (1978); 
the Law on Foreign-Capital Enterprises (1986); the Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint 
Ventures (1988); the Law on Establishment of Holding Companies by Foreign Business 
Entities (2004); the Company Law (revised in 2013) and the Economic Contract Law 
(1981) as well as the Foreign Economic Contract Law (1985). 
These laws made it possible to set up joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned 
companies, including holding companies, subject, of course, to State approval. The 
participation ratio for foreign partners in joint ventures is minimum 25% and maximum 
95% and for local partners minimum 5%. In the joint ventures, contribution in technology 
is compulsory for the foreign partner but it is limited to 20% of the foreign invested capital. 
The joint venture law foresees some limitations in establishing joint ventures, such as the 
violation of the Chinese sovereignty, of Chinese laws and of the environment, obvious 
inequality in the contract as well as hindering of the Chinese economy. 
For joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned companies, the Special Economic Zones 
are of special importance because of their export orientation and tax advantages. 
6. THE FIRST JOINT VENTURE OF VOLKSWAGEN:  
SHANGHAI-VOLKSWAGEN – NEGOTIATIONS AND ESTABLISHMENT
After the ‘open door policy’ of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the Chinese Ministry of Machine 
Building invited several foreign car manufacturers, among them Toyota, General Motors, 
Renault and VWAG, to negotiate the setting up of a joint venture in China for car 
production. Toyota, General Motors and Renault, after a short period of negotiations, did 
not show any interest to set up a joint venture in China estimating that if China will get 
their know-how, it will continue to build and sell their own cars, even abroad. Only VWAG 
had a different appreciation of the situation. Therefore, in 1978, a delegation of VWAG 
went to Beijing to get more detailed information about the intention of the Ministry of 
Machine Building. The Chinese part announced its intention to build 150,000 cars per year 
but VWAG first refused this proposal for reasons of high costs. Shortly thereafter, however, 
Dr. C. H. Hahn, the new CEO of VWAG, was very interested in this project and decided to 
immediately resume negotiations with the Chinese partners. 
19 Ladány (1994) 35.
20 Ladány (1994) 36.
21 Ladány (1994) 52.
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VWAG resumed the negotiations with Shanghai Tractor and Automobile Investment 
Corporation(STAC), a state-owned company, as early as in spring 1979, only a few months 
after the enactment of the Chinese joint venture law. Later on, the Bank of China (BOC) 
and the China National Automotive Industry Corporation (CNAIC) joined the negotiations, 
CNAIC mainly in order to supervise the negotiation on State level and BOC in order to 
guaranty the payment of dividends to VWAG. a Trial Manufacturing Agreement was signed 
on April 11, 1983 as the result of these new negotiations. 
At that time, the negotiation with Chinese partners were not easy as the Chinese 
partners, after a long isolation, were not accustomed to negotiating with foreign partners; 
they were traditionally suspicious about the foreign partners’ sincerity and willingness to 
transfer the most modern technology and update them at the same time as in the home 
country. Only a few members of the Chinese team could speak a foreign language and the 
head of the Chinese team was obliged to frequently report to the authorities, at the local and 
national level. This, of course, delayed the negotiations. The Chinese negotiation team was 
generally large, frequently consisting of 10-15 or more members, mostly engineers, a few 
businessmen and/or accountants and often no lawyers while the VWAG negotiation team 
generally consisted of a team leader, an engineer, a financial expert and a lawyer. The 
foreign and Chinese approaches in negotiations often appeared incompatible and as a result, 
foreigners usually see Chinese negotiators as inefficient, indirect, and even dishonest, while 
Chinese see foreign negotiators as aggressive, impersonal, and excitable.
Such differences have deep cultural roots. In negotiations, the Chinese business people 
usually adopt different intellectual games like, e.g., wei qi as well as other negotiation 
elements, like zhengti guannian. Wei qi is a game originated in the Zhu Dynasty (1046-256 
BC) which is played on a grid of black lines (usually 19x19). The objective of the game is 
to use one’s stones to surround a larger total area of the board than the opponent. The 
Chinese zhengti guannian (holistic thinking) is completely different from the Western type 
of sequential and individualistic thinking, breaking up complex negotiation tasks into a 
series of smaller issues, such as price, quality, delivery, have given rise to a clearly defined 
set of elements that underpins the Chinese negotiation style.22 
This set of elements is:
– zhengti guannian (holistic thinking)
– shehui dengji (social status)
– mianzi (‘Face’ or social capital)
– zhongjian ren (the intermediary used to influence the foreign partner)
– guanxi (personal connection)
– jiejian (thrift)
– chiku nailao (endurance, relentlessness, or eating bitterness and enduring labor)
– renji hexie (interpersonal harmony)23
In negotiations, Chinese partners largely use Sun Zi’s theory on art of war. The ancient 
guidance of Sun Zi means that the wisest posture in combat is to lay back, let one’s opponent 
make fatal mistakes and, only then, capitalise on them. The Chinese negotiating style may 
be characterized by
– opening moves
– period of assessment
22 Fernandez and Underwood (2009) 183.
23 Graham and Lam (2003).
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– end game
– implementation
The Author’s personal experience is that is an opening move characteristic of Chinese 
partners is that they are quite reluctant to negotiate with lawyers and often even in presence 
of lawyers, probably because lawyers do not have the same reputation in China (shenhui 
dengji or social status)24 as in Europe and the USA. However, this situation may have 
changed by now. The Chinese team, consisting of technicians, businessmen and, sometimes, 
officials, tried to write a legal text with non-binding statements and vague formulations, 
while refusing verbatim every pronouncement made by the Western partner. This text is 
then presented it years later, when the circumstances have changed, and insisted that it 
represented a binding promise.
The tricks employed by the Chinese negotiators do not seem any different from those 
employed worldwide, they have however been refined to a ritual. Also, a ritualized 
negotiating process can be entrusted to middle-ranking managers and watched and directed 
discretely by those in real authority who do not wish to show their hand. In this way, those 
in the leadership can grant last minute concession to save negotiations from failure, or 
withhold their approval – without losing face. 
One of the most important tasks of the Chinese negotiators in the opening phase of the 
talks is the search for the ‘right partner’ (zhongjian ren – intermediary) among the 
negotiators in the foreign team. This will not necessarily be the most senior of the foreign 
negotiators, but the one who seems to be forthcoming to the Chinese side. If they find a 
member of the foreign delegation who is willing to talk to them and to his colleagues 
outside of the formal negotiations, and appears to be helpful in putting across their point of 
view, they will shower him with attention and friendliness (renji hexie – personal harmony).
The Chinese are great cultivators of friendly feelings as they believes that friendship results 
in obligations. Therefore, they look for a suitable person to act as a ‘right’ intermediary 
(guanxi – personal connection) between the two delegations.25 
The place of negotiations also plays an important role in negotiations with Chinese 
partners. The negotiations rarely could take place abroad because the need for the Chinese 
negotiators to constantly refer to their superiors and also because of jiejian (thrift). China’s 
history of economic and political instability has namely taught its people to save money. 
In addition, those who have real authority may not like the contract resulting from 
negotiations abroad which they were not able to follow and direct on a day-to-day basis. 
The Chinese location for the talks is particularly important for the second phase 
(period of assessment) where the foreign team is asked to present its ideas in more details. 
Such ideas are immediately communicated to the invisible persons of authority. They will 
then decide the line to be adopted by the Chinese negotiators, reaching their decisions based 
on reports from their negotiators, without discussion with the foreign party. After the main 
line to be taken has been determined by those in authority, the Chinese technique did not 
seem to be particularly original:
– the usual attempt off play out members of the foreign team against each other, the 
labeling of its individual members as ‘good’ or ‘bad’,
– attempts to make the foreign partner feel guilty about delays when opposing 
unacceptable demands,
– attempts to exert pressure through the press and media,
24 Chapel (1998) 172.
25 Graham and Lam (2004) 43.
399A GERMAN LAWYER IN THE FAR EAST: INVESTING AND DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA
It may happen that the Chinese negotiators will be so ‘good’ at the delaying tactics 
designed to tire out the foreigner that they will put themselves under time pressure and as 
result , they suddenly forgot about all-important principles and essential details in the rush 
to be able to submit the signed contract for approval as soon as possible.
In such a case, the essential details will be left out in the hurry but will come back with 
a vengeance and negotiations will be reopened after signatures.
In the VWAG case, the conclusion of the agreement (end of the game) was not yet the 
beginning of business as our contract was subject to approval by the appropriate authority. 
Only after the approval had been obtained, could the assembly of cars and production of 
engines could start (implementation).
It is no wonder that the negotiations between VWAG and STAC, and later on with the 
participation of BOC and CNAIC as further partners, lasted for five years. The reasons are 
multiple and the difficulties in negotiation with Chinese partners has already been mentioned 
but in addition, there were also some political reasons. Chen Yun, then one of the most 
influential leaders of China, was also responsible for approval of foreign investments, 
intentionally delayed the approval of this contract, as reported by the former Chinese Prime 
Minister, Zhao Ziyang.26 The leader of the VWAG negotiating team, Heinz Bauer, noticed 
that for these negotiations, 29 negotiation rounds of three weeks were needed, nine travels 
to China spending there 230 days there altogether, additionally, of course, to the negotiations 
in Wolfsburg.27
This Joint Venture Contract was concluded on November 10, 1984 in Beijing for the 
duration of 25 years, in the presence of the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the 
Secretary of the CCP and Head of the State Zhang Ziyang, between the following partners:
– Volkswagen AG (VW) 50%,
– Shanghai Tractor and Automobile Corporation (STAC) 25% 
– Bank of China (BOC)15% and
– China National Automotive Industry Corporation (CNAIC) 10%.
The Joint Venture Contract contained about 500 pages including the following 
Appendices:
– Articles of Association,
– Technology Transfer Agreement,
– Time Schedule,
– Contributions in Kind,
– Price Fixation,
– Organizational Structure,
– Scope of Responsibility,
– Local Content Development Program,
– Lay-out and External Infrastructure,
– Feasibility Report,
– The Content of Essential Provisions of Employment Contracts for Expatriates, and
– Housing for Expatriates.
These Appendices constituted an integral part of the contract.
The joint venture under the name Shanghai-Volkswagen (SVW) started the assembly 
of Santana and the production of engines in 1985. At that time started also the management 
26 Zhao (2010) 100. 
27 Tangemann (2014).
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of the joint venture. The joint venture contract regulated the management of Shanghai-
Volkswagen in the following way:
– the highest organ of the company was the Board of directors (BoD) consisting of ten 
members, five of which, including the First Vice Chairman, were appointed by VWAG, 
three by STAC, including the Chairman, one by BOC to be the Second Vice Chairman, and 
one by SNAIC; the presence of the representatives of the trade union was compulsory 
though they did not have voting right, 
– the board of directors had especially the following tasks: 
 =  The appointment and revocation of the members of the Executive Committee 
(EXCOM).
 = The establishment of general policy/
 = The establishment of general plans for the realization of the general policy.
 = The establishment of organizational structure
 = The establishment of by-laws
= The establishment of product program
= The establishment of investment program
=  The establishment of personnel plan. The approval of budgets and of annual reports 
as well as of the balance sheet, and profit and loss statements as well as 
= ‘all other activities the Board may deem suitable’.
A unanimous decision was required in many of these cases.
In first stage of its activities, the EXCOM consisted of four members: Managing 
Director, appointed by STAC, Deputy Managing Director, appointed by VWAG and 
responsible for finances, purchase and sales, Technical Director, appointed by VWAG, and 
a Director of Human Resources who was appointed by STAC. The EXCOM was responsible 
– to prepare the meetings of the BOD
– to carry out the resolutions and instructions of the BOD
– to organize and direct the daily business of the company under the – supervision of 
the BOD.
The by-laws of the company stipulated in detail the powers of the EXCOM. 
7. MANAGEMENT OF JOINT VENTURES  
AND WHOLLY FOREIGN-OWNED COMPANIES
In China, the management of joint ventures and even of wholly foreign-owned companies 
requires Chinese management practices which are largely different from the western 
management styles. It is still highly influenced by Confucianism which is the leading factor 
in business practices in China.
When managing a joint venture or a wholly foreign-owned company in China, the 
foreign manager must take several issues into account which are, in general, different from 
their understanding when managing a company in western countries. Such issues are, also 
according to the Author’s experience:
– conflict of interests
– privacy
– intellectual property rights
– management of personnel
– guanxi
– saving ‘Face’
– legality and morality
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– contract and trust, and
– the concept of yi
The concept of conflict of interests was not known as a concept in traditional business 
culture in China because it was quite common for people to do business with their friends 
and relatives first. When managing a joint venture or a wholly foreign-owned company in 
China, one must be very careful in the assessment of conflict of interest for not every 
conflict of interest will be – in western sense – harmful for the company.28 
The concept of privacy is missing in traditional Chinese culture; there is even no direct 
translation in Chinese for the English word ‘privacy’! Therefore, it will be self-understood 
that employees may know, e.g., each other’s salaries.29
Intellectual property right is still a hot issue in China, though this problem is by no 
means a recent one. Already in the early period of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), when the 
Italian Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci gave some precious clocks to the emperor Qianlong 
(1735–1796) as presents, the emperor ordered his experts to dissemble and copy them. 
The clocks were to be produced within a few days, in the same quality as the presents given 
by Matteo Ricci under the menace of death penalty in case of failure! Thus, copying the 
best things was always worth imitation.
In my experience too, Chinese employees prefer clearly defined tasks and are reluctant 
to acceptjobs that involve any uncertainty. However, many foreign managers do not 
understand such an attitude of Chinese employees and complain that the Chinese 
subordinates always ask for detailed instructions, unwilling to act at their own discretion. 
Refusing or even showing reluctance in carrying out orders from one’s superior is viewed 
as disobedience and considered disgraceful. Therefore, due to the love for harmony in 
Chinese culture, open dissent should be avoided. Collectivism also had the effect that the 
Chinese tend not to take personal responsibility. The Chinese do not like formal rule, 
instead they do prefer precise orders.30 Thus, foreign managers must be careful in dealing 
with Chinese personnel: they must be very precise in giving orders avoiding, at the same 
time, to humiliate them because then they loose their ‘Face’ – which is considered 
disastrous!
Guanxi is a special Chinese notion. It is composed by the words ‘guan’ meaning door 
and ‘xi’ meaning a ‘department within an organization’. In the daily life, it mostly means 
‘personal connection’ to be used at the right time and in the right place. The circle of 
persons with guanxi might be very large. The basic circle is one’s family but it may include 
neighbors, schoolmates and other people with tight connection.31 Of course, guanxi ties 
need to be maintained which may be done through wining and dining but also through the 
exchange of favors and by maintaining mutual respect and earnest friendship without any 
intention to harm each other. In fact, it has nothing to do anything with the perception 
western people may have of guanxi such as cronyism, nepotism, bribery, unfairness or 
corruption.32 
The person of the leader such as the family father, the boss of a company, the party 
secretary or the head of the state is of extreme importance in the Chinese society. These 
persons have traditionally a patriarchal role and must therefore be respected. Since the 
status of the leader suggests that he shall be a morally superior person in an ideal Confucian 
28 Liu (2010) 42.
29 Liu (2010) 20.
30 Fernandez and Underwood (2006) 15.
31 Liu (2010) 35.
32 Graham and Lam (2004) 40.
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world, to criticize the leader is a delicate thing to do, and it is even more difficult for the 
leader to acknowledge his fault. Therefore in business, people should act properly to avoid 
losing ‘Face’ or damaging the ‘Face’ of the counterpart. One should especially avoid 
criticizing the leader in public, obliging him to recognize a fault or refuse a requirement.33 
On the other hand, some actions may enhance one’s ‘Face’ like:
– reaching an agreement or smooth execution of the contract,
– having important people present on the signing ceremonies or other important 
occasions, or
– delivering favors to others.34
Chinese prefer not to go to court when they have controversy. Instead, they prefer to 
negotiate the disputed issues either among themselves or by the help of a neutral third party. 
The reason of this attitude is that they have a negative attitude toward law in general and 
court, in particular, because of the predominance of criminal law in their history. As already 
mentioned, also lawyers in negotiations are often considered as a burden and therefore they 
are only asked to join the negotiating team at the final phase of the negotiations. 
Regarding the above mentioned Chinese attitude toward law, it is understandable that 
the contract was not and is neither nowadays an indispensable tool in doing business in 
China. Rather it is considered as a record or proof for a transaction which might be modified 
at any time. However, for the Chinese, if you don’t trust your partner, you will not be 
willing to rely on a piece of paper either. If disputes arise from the contract, they should be 
solved in a friendly way for it is considered as offensive to refer to the contract because the 
words put on the paper some time ago may not correspond anymore to the actual wishes 
and intentions of the parties. Therefore, the Chinese do not intend to honor an agreement 
unconditionally as a primary principle and do not pay only attention to what is agreed upon 
but they also consider the most sensible solution to the contract. 
The most sensible solution to the contract is often considered the way how to amend it 
when the situation changes. Therefore, many consider the signature of a contract not as the 
final point of negotiations but the starting point! The question of honoring a contract is 
especially important and delicate in long term contracts like, e.g., a joint venture contract. 
Here, it is essential:
– either to foresee renegotiations of the contract in a specified period of time, or
– leave strategically important questions open for renegotiations at an appropriate 
time, or
– let some persons or bodies to renegotiate the contract at any time. 
The concept of yi can be traced back to an ancient ritual of sacrifice. It means 
righteousness, correctness, justice and properness and is considered as another concept of 
Confucianism. Yi is not a set of objective rules. It may be affected by rank of hierarchy, 
closeness in relationship, familial values, or ‘Face’. Therefore, Chinese culture is often 
called particularistic because the term yi is referring to what is right and suggests universal 
standards, but in reality, it is actually a particularistic term which may be interpreted case 
by case. In the practice, yi could mean that if the contracting parties are loyal to each other, 
they will very well observe the correct meaning of yi and respect each other’s specific 
situation. Thus, the Chinese party receiving western technology will first of all try to satisfy 
the foreign party’s position and will not try to abuse his own situation which might be 
superior due to the domestic environment and, often, the authority’s influence.35 
33 Liu (2010) 67.
34 Worm (1998) 188.
35 Liu (2010) 81-82.
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8. THE SECOND JOINT VENTURE OF VOLKSWAGEN:  
FIRST AUTOMOBILE WORKS (FAW)
In the negotiations on the first joint venture of VWAG the number of the cars to be produced 
per year was one of the major issues. In fact, the Chinese partners insisted that the joint 
venture should not produce more than 10,000 to 15,000 cars per year! In the 1980s, 
however, China’s economic development largely allowed the production of more cars. The 
main Chinese automotive producer at that time was the FAW in Changchun, Jilin province, 
the former capital of Manchukuo, a puppet state created by Japan in 1931. This company 
was established in 1958 for the production of Hong Qi or Red Flag, the imitation of the 
Soviet product Čajka destined for officials only. One of the first general managers of this 
company was Jiang Zemin, at the time of our negotiations with FAW Secretary General of 
the CCP. But the Red Flag was an outgoing model and the Chinese officials wanted to 
replace it by a new model. Therefore, FAW started negotiations with VWAG and wanted to 
produce Audi 100. For Audi, the subsidiary of VWAG, the mother company conducted the 
negotiations.
The negotiations for this joint venture started in 1988 and lasted much shorter than the 
negotiations for Shanghai Volkswagen probably for several reasons: at that time, Chinese 
negotiators had already more practical experience in negotiating with foreign partners and 
the will of the central authorities to set up this joint venture was obviously decisive. 
Therefore, after two years of negotiation the Joint Venture Contract between VWAG and 
FAW has been signed in 1990 and the production of Jetta and Audi 100 for the Chinese 
market as well as the engines to be exported to Audi was started in 1991. The production 
volume was fixed to 150,000 cars per year.
All of the facilities in the first car plant, including the body shop, paint shop and 
assembly shop came together from the abandoned factory of VWAG’s in Westmoreland, 
USA. FAW-VW started its production with the Jetta and continued later on with the Audi 
100. The structure of this joint venture was the same as the one for SVW.
9. VW GROUP CHINA
Usually, foreign subsidiaries may be controlled either by the mother company or by a 
holding company established in the foreign country, especially when the mother company 
has several subsidiaries in such country. Since the enactment of the Law on Establishment 
of Holding Companies by Foreign Business Entities (2004), many foreign companies that 
have several joint ventures or wholly foreign owned companies set up holding companies.
VWAG did the same. By May 2004, it had concentrated its strength in the founding of 
Volkswagen Group China (VGC), managed by a six-member management team responsible 
for the areas of sales and marketing, technology, purchasing, personnel and governmental 
relations as well as finance. VGC’s task also includes supervision of the joint ventures and 
wholly VW owned companies in China. 
VGC, including, of course, its subsidiaries, has today 95,000 employees, has built 
30 million cars (including the production of cars since 1985 by SAIC and FAW) by now at 
30 Chinese production sites now, which have been sold by 5,000 dealers (with 330,000 
employees). In 2016 alone, VGC has built about 4 million cars. The operating income of 
VGC amounted to EUR 774 million in 2009. VGC has 16 subsidiaries with SAIC and FAW, 
among them the following:
– Volkswagen (China) Investment Company Ltd., Beijing,
– Volkswagen Finance (China) Company Ltd., Beijing,
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– Volkswagen Beijing Center Company Ltd., Beijing,
– Volkswagen FAW Platform Company Ltd. (Powertrain), Changchun,
– FAW-Volkswagen Sales Company Ltd., Changchun,
– Volkswagen FAW Engine (Dalian) Company Ltd., Dalian,
– Volkswagen Transmission (Dalian) Company Ltd., Dalian,
– Volkswagen Transmission (Shanghai) Company Ltd., Shanghai,
– Shanghai Volkswagen Powertrain Company Ltd., Shanghai,
– SAIC-Volkswagen Sales Company Ltd., Shanghai,
– Volkswagen Import Company Ltd., Tianjin,
– SITECH Dongchang Automotive Seating Technology Ltd., Dongchang,
– Volkswagen Hong Kong Ltd., Hong Kong.36
Besides, it has 29 production plants in China, including those of FAW-VW (four) and 
SAIC-VW (eight). These are the following:
– FAW-VW 
 = Changchun (two plants),
 = Chengdu, and
 = Foshan,
– SAIC-VW (formally called Shanghai Volkswagen)
 = Shanghai (three plants),
 = Nanjing,
 = Yizheng,
 = Ningbo,
 = Urumqi, and
 = Changsha,
– 17 component plants, which have produced 
 = components for 3,420 thousand cars and
 = 3.270 thousand engines. 
VGC is now exploiting opportunities through strategic partnerships in four key areas:
– ride sharing,
– mobility club,
– car sharing, 
– financial leasing, and
– Poc e-commerce.37
10. A NEW JOINT VENTURE  
WITH ANHUI JINGHUAI AUTOMOBILE CORP., LTD. (JAC)
VWAG recently launched a new joint venture with JAC for e-mobility holding 50% of the 
stock of the joint venture with a term of 25 years. With this project VGC is pursuing the 
ambitious target for the ‘TOGETHER – Strategy 2025’ program in China with the objective 
to build 400,000 e-vehicles in 2025, together with SAIC, FAW and JAC, the first e-vehicle 
to be built already in 2018. 
36 VW subsidiaries in China (2015) link 16. 
37 New opportunities (2016) link 17. 
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11. SHANGHAI VOLKSWAGEN AUTOMOTIVE COMPANY – TODAY
Recently, SVW changed its name to SAIC-VW. This is an interesting development. At the 
beginning of the negotiations between VWAG and its Chinese partners, VWAG insisted on 
the name ‘Volkswagen Shanghai’ for the joint venture, thus emphasizing the importance of 
the name of the car manufacturer. However, the Chinese partners resisted claiming that, the 
joint venture would be in Shanghai and therefore ‘Shanghai’ was to be mentioned first. 
Finally, the negotiating team of VWAG could persuade the board of management of VWAG 
to accept the Chinese point of view arguing that in the name ‘Shanghai-Volkswagen’ the 
word ‘Shanghai’ could be considered as a mere adjective! 
In the meantime, also STAC changed its name into Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation – SAIC. In 2010, the equity holdings was split and the present participation 
ratio is as follows: 
– Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) 50%,
– Volkswagen AG 40%, and
– Volkswagen (China) Investment Co., Ltd. 10%.
In the meantime the term of the Joint Venture Contract has been extended to another 
45 years, now running until 2030. 
Being the biggest shareholder of Shanghai-Volkswagen, SAIC recently insisted to 
change the name of the joint venture into ‘SAIC-Volkswagen’. VWAG accepted this 
proposal.
In April 2005, Škoda officially landed at SVW where they to produce its different 
models. The production of the first Škoda car, Octavia, started the production in June 2007, 
other types of Škoda followed.
By October 2009, SVW (now SAIC-VW) had turned out over five million cars in total, 
becoming the carmaker with the biggest population of cars in China. Its 22,000 employees 
are now producing the following models:
– Volkswagen:
 = Tiguan LWB
 = Touran
 = Passat New Lingyu
 = New Passat
 = Lavida (Sedan)
 = Grand Lavida
 = Cross Polo
 = Polo (Hatchback, Cross Polo, Polo GTI)
 = Santana Vista
– Škoda:
 = Octavia
 = Fabia
 = Superb
 = Yeti, and
 = Rapid38
In 2016, SAIC-VW produced 1.90 million cars.
38 SAIC-VW models (2009) link 18. 
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12. FAW-VOLKSWAGEN – TODAY
In 1995, FAW, VW AG and Audi decided to integrate Audi to the product line of FAW-VW 
and in 1996, the first Audi 100 rolled off the line. In the same year the engine shop started 
running. 
In 1997, FAW-Volkswagen Sales Company Ltd. was established as a joint venture 
between FAW-VW and the FAW Group with equity holdings of 50% for each. The 
participation in the company is today as follows: 
– FAW Group: 60%
– Volkswagen AG: 20%
– Audi AG: 10%, and
– Volkswagen (China) Investment Co., Ltd.: 10%.
FAW-VW is actually producing the following models:
– Audi A3 Type 8V
– Audi A4L Type B9
– Audi A6L Type C7
– Audi Q3
– Audi Q5
– Volkswagen Jetta Night,
– Volkswagen Bora Mk. II
– Volkswagen C-Treck
– Volkswagen Golf Mk.VII
– Volkswagen Golf GTI Mk.VII
– Volkswagen Sagitar Mk. II
– Volkswagen Magotan Type B8L, and
– Volkswagen CC Type 3539
13. PRESENT SITUATION IN THE CHINESE CAR INDUSTRY
In 1985, only about 10,000 passenger cars were sold in China.40 In 2016, VGC sold 3.98 
million units (sales of the cars produced in the joint ventures of SAIC and FAW as well as 
imported cars), i.e., 12.2% more than in the previous year. Among these cars
– 3 million were Volkswagen,
– 591,600 Audi,
– 317,100 Škoda and
– 65,200 Porsche,
In the same year VGC made a profit of USD 5.36 billion (or 5 billion Euro). 
Within the VGC, the production is constantly oriented toward the future based 
crossbrand production strategy. Digitalization, autonomous driving and e-mobility will 
fundamentally transform the automobile production of VGC. In 2020, VGC plans to 
produce 400,000 e-cars and 1.5 million in 2025. 
In 2016, 18.68 million new cars were produced in China, more than in the USA where 
the car production reached ‘only’ 17.5 million. In this period, VGC produced and sold 3.026 
million cars, which represent 16% of the Chinese market, thus being behind General 
39 FAW-VW models (2016) link 19.
40 Unbegrenzter Wachstum (2015) link 20.
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Motors. The latter produced and sold 3.61 million of cars in China, representing 19% of the 
Chinese market.
It is noteworthy that, in Beijing alone 1,200 new cars are being registered on average 
per day. No wonder, as today there are 6,322 companies that produce cars in China’s 27 
provinces (out of 31 provinces) and since 2002 about 50% of the sales went to private 
persons. This development is also remarkable because today there are very high taxes for 
the admission of new cars – up to 178,000 Euros per car depending, of course, on the 
acquired model.41
Can such an amount of cars be continued to be produced in China? On the one hand 
yes, because in China, there are still only 30 cars per 1,000 inhabitants while in the USA 
and in the EU countries there are 400-500 cars per 1,000 inhabitants. On the other hand, 
there are 684,000 victims per year due to air pollution. Therefore, it is planned that in 
10 years China will not issue license plate for fuel and diesel cars at all.
14. OTHER ACTIVITIES OF VGC
Besides of producing cars, VGC also supports the arts, culture and sports in China e.g., the 
Artistic Engagement Program in order to spread cultural activities throughout China. With 
the ‘VGC Music Night’, VGC brought together the Shanghai Symphony Orchestra and 
students from the Shanghai Orchestra Academy with principal musicians from the German 
Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) Philharmonie Orchester. VGC also supports the China 
Youth Football Training and is promoting, in general, football in China. In this context it is 
interesting to note that already in 1992, SVW financed a German football coach for the 
Chinese national team. 
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